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BEYOND DESIRE?  AGENCY, CHOICE, AND THE PREDICTIVE 
MIND* 
Andy Clark 
Department of Philosophy and Department of Informatics,  University of 
Sussex, Brighton, UK  
 
Abstract 
‘Predictive Processing’ (PP) is an emerging paradigm in cognitive neuroscience 
that depicts the human mind as an uncertainty management system that 
constructs probabilistic predictions of sensory signals. Such accounts apply very 
naturally to perception, and have plausible extensions to motor control. But 
desires and motivations can seem to pose a much greater puzzle, appearing 
especially resistant to reconstruction by a processing story that appeals to 
predictions alone. I examine several versions of this worry, and show that it is 
fundamentally misplaced.  Desires and motivations are fluently accommodated 
within the unifying PP schema, where they emerge as webs of prior ‘beliefs’ 
that sculpt probabilistic predictions, some of which become positioned (as we 
shall see) so as to bring about actions. Importantly, a single construct here plays 
the role of belief and desire. But what results is, perhaps surprisingly, a 










Can a processing paradigm that treats biological brains as prediction engines 
accommodate the apparently distinctive cognitive role of wants, intentions, and 
desires? The problem arises because leading ‘predictive processing’ (henceforth, 
PP for short) versions of this paradigm suggest that neurally realized 
predictions are the only fundamental ‘cognitive kind’ needed to explain the full 
sweep of human behavior - see  [Friston 2009; Hohwy 2013; Clark 2013; Clark 
2016]. These neurally realized predictions may differ in their strengths, contents, 
and functional poise. But they are (or so it is claimed) best conceived as 
predictions nonetheless. In this austere landscape our actions are brought about 
by systemically potent predictions that act as ‘self-fulfilling prophecies’ [Friston 
2009: 295]. We’ll take a better look at how this works shortly. But at the most 
local (action-guiding) level, these self-fulfilling prophecies depict the act as 
currently taking place, and are then made true by performing the action. 
Predictions (of varying kinds, some more abstract and general than others) 
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must thus stand in for both general, long-term wants and intentions and for 
specific motor commands. Thus [Friston, Mattout and Kilner 2011:157] note 
that: 
 
Crucially [PP] does not invoke any ‘desired consequences’. It rests only 
on experience-dependent learning and inference: experience induces 
prior expectations, which guide perceptual inference and action  
 
In what follows, I explain, motivate, and defend this broad picture. I respond, 
in particular, to a raft of worries and criticisms raised in Klein [2016]. Klein’s 
core concern is that PP, by casting everything to do with motivation, agency 
and desire in the form of predictions, restricts itself to an impoverished set of 
primitives. The result, he fears, is that the story will fail to capture key patterns 
in human behavior. 
 
 Another way to raise such worries (Colombo [2017]) is by pursuing the 
thought that predictions alone seem, on the face of it, to be motivationally inert. 
Motivation here signifies the whole complex of mental faculties or profiles 
sometimes referred to as ‘conation’, and taken by many to provide something 
that ‘mere cognition’ cannot. That something may be variously thought of as 
drive, impetus, desire, or willing. Whatever the flavor, the core idea is the same, 
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and was perhaps most powerfully articulated by Hume [738/2007 section 
2.3.3.6] who argued that reasons without passions would be entirely unable to 
mandate specific actions.  
 
 Cognitions and conations, on this Humean picture, make fundamentally 
different kinds of contribution to the ongoing selection of action, and belief 
alone is insufficient for motivation. An agent might believe or even predict that 
her house is on fire, but what she does about that will depend on her desires. 
Does she desire to preserve her property or to claim on her insurance?  
Imagine – odd as it may seem – that she has no desires whatsoever concerning 
her own house. Then, faced with the opportunity to feed or to try to put out 
the fire, she will find no spur to act at all.  Actions arise, it seems, only from the 
interplay between reason and passion – between belief and desire, or belief and 
other conative states such as fear, envy, or lust.  
 
 Similar issues arises in prominent treatments of reward- learning, such as 
that by Arpaly and Schroeder [2014: 286] who write that: 
 
Predictions are true or false; they make claims about how the world will 
be. Desires are neither true nor false, and they make no claims about 
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how the world will be.….we assume we are on safe ground in holding 
that the unconscious predictive system does not, itself, instantiate desires.  
 
 The distinction between beliefs and desires, and the idea that these are 
fundamentally different kinds of state is widely embraced in daily life. It forms 
a core part of common-sense (or ‘folk’) psychology, enabling us to say that we 
hope that our predictions (e.g. about feelings of coldness on the way to work in 
winter) do not come true. It is also deeply embedded more scientific 
frameworks such as statistical decision-theory (including neuro-economics and 
work on reinforcement learning) where it emerges as the firm separation 
between encodings of value or ‘utility’ and encodings of probability (for a 
useful review, see Sanfey et al [2006]). 
 
 In the rest of this paper, I’ll argue that despite first appearances, the PP 
framework has the resources to deliver an elegant and general account of desire 
and motivated action. But it is an account that posits no pair of fundamentally 






 Section 2 displays the basic form of the PP treatment and its extension 
to  action. Section 3 addresses the matrix of worries raised by Klein [2016]. In 
section 4, I widen the discussion to include some related issues raised by 
Holton [2016]. These concern the proper framing of addiction and the 
resulting need (in PP) to invoke multiple levels and types of prediction, 
including (especially) predictions of the hedonic consequences of our own 
actions. Building on all this, Section 5 shows how PP offers a general picture of 
human agency. The paper ends (section 6) by asking whether the story on offer 
is eliminative or reconstructive regarding the folk ontology itself.  
 
 The conclusion, in a nutshell, is that the behavioral patterns we think of 
as reflecting desires can be successfully and plausibly conceived as underpinned 
by high-level predictions – ones that, in context, recruit further predictions 
whose proprioceptive consequences are then made true by action. This picture 
is revisionary insofar as it depicts our internal cognitive economy as operating 
using a single construct (model-based prediction) that plays the role of both 
beliefs and desires. But surprisingly (or so I argue) the upshot is not an 
impoverished vision of the human mind so much as an appreciation of a richer 




2. The Basic Schema 
 
 ‘Predictive processing’ (PP) has been positioned as a new paradigm for 
understanding perception, reason, and action [Friston 2005; Hohwy 2013; 
Clark 2013; Clark 2016; Pezzulo, Rigoli, and Friston: 2018]. Viewed from a 
certain distance, PP is just a process model that extends the popular picture of 
the ‘Bayesian Brain’ (see e.g. Knill and Pouget [2004]) to include action. 
Bayesian brains optimally combine prior knowledge with new (sensory) 
evidence so as continuously to update their models of how things stand in the 
world. Real brains may approximate this kind of optimal updating in various 
ways (for some discussion, see Wiese [2016]).  
 
 PP constitutes one such family of ways, casting human brains as experts 
at minimizing their own long-term expected prediction error (for discussion, 
see [Howhy 2013:175-6; Friston 2018: 579]. Prediction error itself is simply the 
difference (residual error) between current predictions, reflecting the brain’s 
best model-based guess at the evolving sensory flow, and the incoming sensory 
evidence itself. That error is computed, PP suggests, moment-by-moment, and 
at every level of processing. When error is adequately quashed, no further 
processing is required. But where there is mismatch, something needs to give. 
Crudely, we either revise our best model-based guess at how the world is, or we 
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alter the world or the way we are probing the world, so as to bring the sensory 
evidence more into line with our current predictions. The latter delivers action, 
the former perception, and the two constantly co-evolve as we probe and 
manipulate the very world we perceive (see Friston, Daunizeau et al [2010], 
Clark [2016], Fabry [2017], Bruineberg et al [2016], Kirchhoff [2018]). 
  
 Consider reaching for a glass. To bring about the motor action, the PP 
system (see Shipp et al [2013]) predicts the evolving states of muscle spindles, 
tendons, and joints that the reaching action demands. Since those states are not 
yet actual, a suite of prediction errors results. These errors are then 
systematically quashed by moving the body so as to make the flow of 
predictions come true. Cashed out by simple reflex arcs, this turns out to be an 
elegant and economical means of delivering motor control (Adams, Shipp, and 
Friston [2013]). The same basic schema applies (see section 4 below) to desired 
consequences at longer timescales.  
 
 Crucially, PP depicts the whole prediction-error minimizing process as 
nuanced and orchestrated at every level by independently coded measures of 
self-estimated uncertainty (‘precision’). For example, when viewing a familiar 
scene in clear daylight, the brain may assign high reliability (high certainty, high 
precision) to the visual information, while on a foggy day visual information 
	 9	
might be assigned less reliability (less certainty, less precision) relative to stored 
information about the environment. Variable precision-weighting is here 
thought to implement attention, in all its many forms (see Feldman and Friston 
[2010]). So another way to think about precision-weighting is as the brain’s way 
of stressing one body or type of information over another, and (in just the 
same way) balancing current top-down predictions against incoming sensory 
evidence – for a full discussion, see Clark [2016] chapter 2. Quite generally, 
then ‘precision-weighting’ (whose many mechanisms include neurotransmitters 
and time-locked neuronal oscillations) weights predictions and prediction 
errors according to systemic confidence in their value, context-varying 
usefulness, and reliability for the task at hand.  
 
 Variable precision-weighting makes these systems extremely flexible, 
allowing them to repeatedly redeploy stored knowledge for different purposes 
and in widely varying contexts. It is also the key to action. Bringing about 
action in this way requires attenuating (assigning low precision to) the sensory 
information currently indexing the actual disposition of the body, so as to 
enable precise proprioceptive predictions (corresponding to some desired 
trajectory) to prevail, in the manner describe above.  Intentional action thus 
depends upon a delicate balance that combines precise proprioceptive 
predictions with attenuated information concerning current bodily states 
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(Brown et al [2013]).  An interesting consequence, as noted by Wiese [2017] is 
that action thus depends on a kind of ‘systematic misrepresentation’ of how 
our body is currently arrayed in space! 
 
 Contrary to both the folk and standard neuro-economic images, this PP 
picture marks no fundamental distinction corresponding to cognitive and 
conative states. Instead, PP treats all forms and timescales of behavioral control 
as the results of precision-weighted neural predictions. These predictions issue 
from many different (but interacting) neural areas, and are cast at many levels 
of granularity, as we will later see. 
 
 PP, as even this highly truncated sketch shows, has a viable mechanism 
for bringing actions about. But the mere presence of such a mechanism may 
not be enough, if PP cannot explain when and why that mechanism becomes 
active.  Why should we get rid of some prediction errors by action, when we 
might just as well (it seems) simply revise our predictions and suffer the 
consequences? More dramatically, it may be asked why, in the apparent absence 
of distinctly desire-like states aiming at life, light, and food, don’t prediction 
agents simply find a dark corner and stay there, slowly dying of hunger and 
thirst while very successfully predicting that dismal but reliable sensory flux? 
This worry – the so-called ‘Darkened Room Objection’ (see Friston, Thornton, 
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and Clark [2012]) forms the starting point for an important recent critique of 
the PP proposal, to which we now turn. 
 
3. What Predictive Coders Predict 
 
In his [2018] paper  ‘What Do Predictive Coders Want?’ Colin Klein presses 
these issues through multiple argumentative iterations. Klein’s starting point is 
the infamous ‘Darkened Room’ puzzle rehearsed above. The core of that 
puzzle, as Klein [2018: 2554) sees it, is that “prediction alone…is not enough to 
get us to the adaptive actions that we in fact perform”. 
 
 Let’s move fairly swiftly over the first steps here. As we saw, PP has core, 
well-understood resources able to position certain sensory predictions so as to 
bring about local actions. Specifically, high precision proprioceptive predictions 
act as motor commands able to program the right actions when the 
opportunity arises. Better yet, (as we’ll see in more detail in section 4 below) the 
same kind of story applies at longer timescales too, so that long-term plans and 
projects are realized as standing predictions to the effect that we will initiate 
project-furthering actions as and when the opportunity arises. Thus, a long-
term prediction that I will pass my yacht-master exam acts as a kind of constant 
opportunity filter, so that when chances for practice and improvement arise, 
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they vie with other current opportunities to recruit actions. The winning 
predictions at a given moment spawn local proprioceptive predictions, and 
these are cashed as actions.  
 
 Importantly, precise proprioceptive predictions are always preferentially 
positioned to be quashed by action rather than by the alteration of what is 
predicted (for the full mechanistic story, see Shipp et al [2013]).  To ensure this 
preferential positioning requires, as we saw, a concomitant attenuation of the 
(veridical) sensory evidence specifying the current state of the bodily plant. In 
order to move, we must actively downgrade (dis-attend to) information 
concerning the current bodily state, so as to allow the motor image of the 
predicted state to prevail 1 . The upshot is that “sensory attenuation is a 
necessary precondition for – and part of – an intended movement” [Owens et 
al 2018:177]. As the same authors later comment “Without this functional 
change in gain, prediction errors would lead to revised predictions rather than 
action” [Owens at al 2018:180].  
 
																																																								
1	This is by no means an ad hoc addition to the story. Recent PP treatments of 
disorders of movement, such as Parkinson’s disease, all point to empirically 
confirmed disruptions of sensory attenuation (see Brown, Adams et al [2013], 
Parees at al [2014] – see also Palmer et al [2016]). 
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 PP thus possesses both a mechanism for engaging and controlling action 
(via descending proprioceptive) predictions and a systematic way to determine 
when to revise predictions and when to alter body (and sometimes world) by 
engaging action. But the real heart of Klein’s worry hereabouts, I suspect, lies 
elsewhere. It is not the lack of a workable prediction-based means for 
entraining action, nor is it he need for a systematic proximal means of knowing 
when to act rather than revise beliefs (which is taken care of by the preferential 
positioning of precise proprioceptive predictions, whenever they are generated). 
Instead, the worry may be that PP seems (to Klein) to lack an account of when 
and why we select the specific actions we do. Translated into the PP framework, 
this means an account of why it is that some behavioral options get assigned 
high enough precision to remain ‘in the driving seat’ for the control of action at 
a certain moment in time. Thus Klein [2018:2545] asks: 
 
Why not, for example, eliminate the error caused by the prediction that 
I’ll eat by revising that prediction rather than getting some food? 
 
There is, to repeat, a very effective proximal mechanism for resolving this. If a 
food-seeking action such as picking up the phone to order a takeaway, is 
assigned high precision, current sensory information specifying that my hand is 
not currently moving is attenuated, and the food ordering scenario prevails. But 
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the real question then becomes: why are the checks and balances in the PP 
economy thus and so? Why is the strong prediction of food-ordering (that 
programs the rest of the economy) currently entrenched? 
 
 One response at this point has been to depict some predictions as simply 
more deeply ingrained than others. Perhaps we cannot help (at some level) but 
predict food and safety, no matter what the weight of lifetime evidence  - from, 
for example, living in a war zone – suggests. This fits with the picture presented 
by Friston [2011] according to which some predictions are in effect simply 
definitional of the creatures concerned. As an evolved being, I thus chronically 
predict a certain temperature range – the one needed for a creature like me to 
survive. Predictions are made on the basis of a generative model, and the 
generative model that we (considered as whole embodied organisms) instantiate 
will have been shaped by both evolution and lifetime learning so as to be one 
that ensures we are deeply disposed to predict, with high, action-entraining 
precision, the kinds of sensory state that help keep us alive and viable. Among 
such deep-set predictions we will find, for example, ones that mandate keeping 
key features of the bodily plant within tolerable limits. Deep-set interoceptive 
predictions [Seth 2015] may thus ensure that darkened food-free rooms hold 
no allure for the normally functioning human agent. 
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 But of course, such deep-set predictions get us only so far. At some 
point, the PP theorist needs to accommodate the ordinary shifting webs of (as 
we would ordinarily say) desire: the ebbs and flows of intention that sometimes 
lead us to play the piano, then to work on a paper, then to order a Chinese 
rather than an Indian takeaway, watch a certain movie, and so on. 
 
 This is where the shifting web of precision assignments, and the multiple 
time-scales of prediction, must work together to realize the full spectrum of 
context-varying motivation and choice. We select specific actions, PP claims, 
because we already (both personally and sub-personally) encode a host of 
(complexly interacting) multi-timescale predictions, and because our brains 
constantly adjust the precisions with which these predictions are held. As both 
our inner states (hunger, thirst etc.) and outer contexts ebb and flow, some 
predictions enjoy increased precision, becoming positioned to drive immediate 
actions while others remain in the background, awaiting the right opportunity 
to arise. Right now, for example, it is my high-precision prediction that I am 
exploring Klein’s argument that is selecting my actions – both at the level of 
looking up various papers to check my claims, and then making specific key-
strokes (cashing out precise proprioceptive predictions) on my computer.  
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The skeptic might press the issue by asking why a given agent predicts the very 
things she does, with their various weightings. Perhaps she chooses to order 
tofu rather than chicken for the take-away. Why did her lifetime learning 
position the tofu prediction so as to trump her colleague’s suggestion of 
chicken? The PP mechanism itself offers no concrete story here. But neither 
does an account that appeals to separately encoded motivations or desires. The 
question of why certain desires dominate action and choice at time T is now 
simply replaced with the question of why certain predictions are assigned high 
precision at time T. Neither one of these questions is (as far as I can tell) any 
easier, or simpler, than the other. 
 
 Some commonplace human experiences may seem to work against this 
suggested assimilation of altered desires and motivations to altered precision-
weighted predictions. Most notably there is the feeling that, as Klein [2018] 
puts it, something else needs to be there to ensure we keep moving and acting 
rather than simply tracking states of our own body and the wider world. 
Predictions just do not seem like the kinds of things that have the requisite 
‘oomph’ to drive us to action – they seem, on their own, to lack intrinsic 
motivating force.  But this, as we saw earlier, is not the case. The motivating 
force is instead provided by the shifting assignments of precision to varying 
	 17	
predictions. Highly-weighted predictions drive actions, and do so every bit as 
directly as (on more standard models) would strong preferences and desires. 
 
 The devout Humean, confronted with the this proposal, may insist there 
must still be something (some kind of inner or mental state) that is not itself 
cast in terms of predictions that sets it all in motion: some additional inner 
force favouring some actions or outcomes over others. To really get to grips 
with the PP story, it is important to stress that this is not the case. Instead, 
there is simply a rich precision-inflected predictive economy some of whose 
key aspects have been put in place by evolution, others by lifetime learning. 
That web of predictions changes and evolves as new contexts arise and new 
information is acquired,  by means of ongoing self-organization around the 
organismically accessible quantity of prediction error. It is our changing 
predictions (both responding to, and inflected by, changing assignments of 
precision) that must now explain all the kinds of changes in response ordinarily 
captured by folk-psychological talk of changing motives, goals, and desires.  
 
 Superficially still puzzling, perhaps, is the nature and origin of apparently 
idiosyncratic individual desires and motivations. Consider, once again, my 
desire to go to see a certain movie tonight. PP realizes this desire as a high-level 
prediction that (when estimated as sufficiently precise) entrains apt actions at 
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many time-scales. This is actually a familiar (Bayesian) trick for transforming 
control and selection problems into belief-based inference problems, enabling 
that well-understood apparatus to deliver choice and planning behavior too (see, 
for example, [Toussaint 2009;Todorov 2009]). But where did that high-level 
prediction itself come from? The answer is not obvious – but nor (to repeat) is 
it any more obvious if we stick with unanalyzed appeals to motivation or desire. 
Either way, what really needs to be explained is the process of change in long-
term states that bring about actions. As PP agents move, think, and act in their 
worlds they change and alter their own webs of precision-inflected multi-level 
probabilistic belief. In that way they constantly alter the processing that in the 
future brings about their own actions.  
 
 Klein remains skeptical, and for two main reasons. The first is that all we 
may have then done, he argues, is recreate the classic belief/desire split using 
PP resources. In one way this is absolutely right – the PP story now 
accommodates all the behaviors we ordinarily use talk of beliefs and desires to 
capture. But PP aims squarely at a sub-personal mechanism. And at that level, 
PP has indeed replaced the traditional constructs of beliefs, desires, and 
rewards with a single construct – that of predictions which, when they are held 
with high precision and have proprioceptive consequences, entrain apt action. I 
return to this issue in Section 5. 
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 Klein’s second worry is that these interacting predictions will now ignite 
an explosion of complexity. For example, how do I rank which action gets high 
precision next? Klein [2018:2550] argues that “ordinary belief-desire models 
can avail themselves of the standard combinatorial resources of computational 
theories to try to sort out these problems”. Here, Klein either greatly over-
estimates the power and successes of the standard stories or greatly under-
estimates the resources of the PP alternative. There is no doubting that 
selecting which action to perform next, given a large body of world-knowledge, 
is computationally challenging. But it is no more challenging using PP 
resources than it is using more traditional ones. All the results of reinforcement 
learning (to take just one example) are available to PP, simply by re-casting 
value and reward in terms of precision-weighted prediction error (surprisal) 
minimization. Instead of aiming sub-personally at rewards, PP agents aim sub-
personally at minimizing surprise about future states. This, in turn, requires 
them to adopt policies (long-term behavioral strategies) that will deliver just 
that (for the full story, see [Schwartenbeck et al 2013; Pezzulo, Rigoli, and 
Friston 2018]). Moreover, neither the classic story nor the PP alternative has 
very much to say about the origins of idiosyncratic desires (idiosyncratic 
predictions, for PP), save that organisms start somewhere, then move around 
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their physical and social worlds in ways that progressively install their 
tendencies to seek out science fiction, or horror stories, or to breed exotic fish. 
 
 One final point deserves a brief mention. Klein also worries, towards the 
end of the 2018 paper, that PP inherits (from the so-called ‘free energy 
principle’, which is not our focus today) a kind of objectionable absolutism. 
The worry is that if the goal is really to minimize prediction error (free energy) 
then only actions that do so will be selected, leaving no room for actions that 
reduce but do not quite minimize that same quantity. This is simply mistaken. 
The best way to minimize expected prediction error over time may well be to 
perform actions that have exactly the ‘partial’ character that Klein celebrates. 
Eating half an apple is better than eating hot lava (to use his own example) 
because eating half the apple plausibly reduces some prediction error whereas 
eating the lava actually increases it. Over time, selecting actions that make 
partial headway with goals serves to minimize overall expected error (see 
[Pezzulo, Rigoli et al 2015, 2018; Friston, Schwartenbeck et al 2014]). Perhaps 
relatedly, there is a cost-of-modeling issue that Klein has failed to spot. PP aims 
[Clark 2016: chapter 8] at the use of the most minimally expensive (fewest 
parameter) models that will reduce the greatest amount of expected prediction 
error. This immediately implies that solutions that are intuitively ‘just-good-
enough’ are often PP-optimal. 
	 21	
 
4. When Predictions and Desires Conflict 
 
There is a related issue nicely foregrounded in Holton [2016]. It concerns the 
frequent appearance of conflict between our best predictions and our strongest 
desires. Imagine you have an itch. You want to scratch it, but you predict that 
this would be bad for your skin. Still, the urge is overwhelming. You scratch 
and suffer the consequences. How are we to understand this kind of daily 
misadventure? According to the standard picture, the conflict arose between 
two fundamentally different ‘mental kinds’ – what we want (to scratch the itch) 
and what we predict  (that this will be bad for our skin). And in this case, the 
desire won out. 
 
 PP tells a different story. If PP is correct, the weak-willed scratcher 
harbors conflicting belief-like states. These states are really predictions2, some 
of which (those assigned high precision) get to bring about actions. They 
include both the prediction that scratching will harm the skin and should be 
avoided, and the prediction that I am going to scratch that itch here and now. 
The latter, having proprioceptive consequences that are currently predicted 
																																																								
2	More accurately, these comprise both probabilistic priors (when they are long-
term or standing states) and predictions (when they are active states). 	
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with high precision, renders the former transiently impotent. Scratching ensues. 
As always, PP here replaces desires with predictions, which select gross actions 
only when they have proprioceptive consequences that are being assigned high 
precision. In one sense, these predictions are beliefs about our own future 
behaviors. But high-level predictions (when opportunities are spotted, so they 
spawn precise proprioceptive predictions) are also the drivers of the predicted 
behavior. This means they are best not assimilated to either the folk-
psychological category of desire or  the folk-psychological category of belief.  
 
  Holton [2016:10] suggests that assimilating desires to predictions 
“doesn't do justice to the multiplicity and malleability of human desire”, citing 
cases in which drug addicts (for example) may seek out a desired substance 
while simultaneously believing that taking the drug won’t bring them either 
happiness or pleasure. Instead the drugs are said to be “simply intrinsically 
wanted”. This fact is then claimed to be “radically at odds with anything the 
predictive processing account says about us”. But we can now see why this 
need not be the case. For what looks, from Holton’s perspective, to be a clear 
case of conflict between belief and desire may now be re-cast as a difference 
between predictions of different kinds. Specifically, the predictive processing 
story firmly distinguishes [Friston, Shiner et al. 2012] between action-entraining 
high-precision predictions concerning what I will do and predictions of the 
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hedonic (interoceptive) outcomes of those very actions. PP thus accommodates 
the fact, highlighted by Holton, that drug users often do not believe/predict 
that taking the drugs will actually lead to happiness. But what they do 
powerfully (if often sub-personally) predict is seeking and ingesting the drug. 
PP thus fluidly reconstructs the useful distinction between ‘wanting’ and ‘liking’ 
suggested by Berridge [2007].  For a full PP treatment of this, see 
Schwartenbeck, Fitzgerald et al [2015]. 
 
 More generally, and given that the addict need not predict that the drugs 
will bring pleasure, PP remains well-placed to explore a wide variety of 
promising accounts in which many of the addict’s experiences and actions are 
the results of interacting sub-personal (non-conscious) predictions and 
expectations. For example, it has been known since the work of Siegel [1983] 
that mere exposure to the paraphernalia associated with drug use can trigger 
physiological symptoms of withdrawal. Their explanation appeals to a 
physiological preparation for the predicted effects of the drug (inducing so-
called ‘tolerance’).  Thus Siegel and Ramos [2002:171] comment that “some 
drug ‘withdrawal’ symptoms are more accurately drug ‘preparation symptoms’ ”. 
One very natural way to think about such results is to see the setting and 
paraphernalia as triggering a sub-personal stream of both inward-looking 
(bodily) and outward-looking predictions, which actively warp sensation in the 
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direction of certain strongly predicted effects. Such effects, PP suggests, are 
mediated by dopamine and other neurotransmitters that modulate the delicate 
balance between sensory evidence and ‘top-down’ predictions, and now fall 
neatly into place within a larger framework that is being successfully applied to  
a wide range of medical symptoms (see e.g. [Bergh et al 2017]). 
 
 All this suggests that there is nothing austere or conceptually 
impoverished about the PP story concerning motivated behavior.  On the 
contrary, where more traditional stories posit a single division between belief-
like and desire-like states, PP depicts as many varieties of ‘predictive controller’ 
as there are varieties of ways and means of contextualizing lower-level response. 
Fears that PP is fated to miss complexity or merely reconstruct the traditional 
story are deeply misplaced. Instead, the new story is potentially more powerful, 
recognizing a richer and more subtly varied continuum in which deep goal 
hierarchies constantly inflect perception and action in ways determined by ever-
shifting webs of precision. In the remaining two sections, I expand further 
upon this claim, and discuss the extent to which PP is revisionary with regard 





5. The Stepladder to Agency 
 
To recap, PP offers a promising and mechanistically viable account of simple 
intentional motor actions. Precise high-level predictions conspire to enable 
motor ‘wishes’ – here realized by precise proprioceptive predictions combined 
with attenuated current sensory information  -  to entrain the bodily plant. This 
works without any need to introduce distinctly conative factors. That same 
story must apply ‘all the way up’. Our action-guiding proprioceptive predictions 
are themselves caused by even higher-level and longer time-scale predictions – 
predictions about our own future behaviors and our own resulting future states. 
These now form a kind of temporal stepladder in which different beliefs about 
our own future actions entrain those very actions by triggering apt 
proprioceptive predictions (the proximal action-makers) when good 
opportunities arise. In this way (laid out in more detail by [Pezzulo et al 2015; 
2018]) nested beliefs entrain actions at many interacting  time-scales by bringing 
about predicted sensory flows.  
 
As a cameo, suppose that as I move around my world today, harvesting sensory 
information, I come to believe/predict that I will meet you at the movie-theatre 
for the 8 pm showing tonight. This high-level belief yields activity (perhaps I 
consult the web) that in turn leads me to believe/predict that I will get the 730 
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bus. That prediction then acts as a kind of (defeasible) mini-policy that enslaves 
further apt motor action when it is time for me to leave the house. What we do 
is determined, this story suggests, by precise (highly weighted) high-level 
predictions that respond to worldly opportunities by delivering a whole swathe 
of apt lower-level sensory and motor predictions. High-level predictions thus 
act as controllers, determining how we act in the world. Such predictions are 
both somewhat belief-like (being about what is predicted to occur) and 
somewhat desire-like (being functionally poised to bring those very things 
about).  
 
 These are fully-fledged exercises of agency, and they involve what has 
sometimes been described [Pezzulo et al  2015;  Seth 2015] as  ‘counterfactual 
prediction’. In such cases a temporally deep [Friston, Rosch et al 2017; Friston 
2018] prediction-issuing generative model includes predictions of what we would 
experience (e.g. arriving at the movie theatre) if we acted in some specific way. 
For this to be possible, advanced agents must command a probabilistic model 
of how their own sensory experience would be altered or updated (and 
expected prediction error reduced) were they to perform such and such actions.  
The active human agent thus turns up, implicitly, as a kind of latent variable (a 
so-called “hidden cause”) in her own model of future sensory unfoldings. But 
crucially, as argued by Friston and Adams [2012], she is a hidden cause of 
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sensory unfoldings that are highly controllable by her own actions – unlike 
many other hidden causes, such as weather and volcanoes. In this way, agency 
itself emerges naturally from prediction machinery operating over multiple 
time-scales. 
 
 At this point new opportunities arise. Future goals can now be 
approached (as in the movie-going case) by the adoption of sensible long-term 
policies, where these are simply belief-complexes that entrain sequences of 
actions, each of which delivers predictable sensory flows that bring us closer to 
some goal. We here enter the space of long-term goal-directed systems, ones 
that: 
 
….represent counterfactual future states, and minimize the difference 
between the preferred or goal state and outcomes predicted from the 
current stat…[a]…prospective form of control…supported by the ability 
of higher hierarchical levels to anticipate the future and to select policies 
that enslave action. [Pezzulo et al. 2015: 24] 
  
Ongoing arbitration between multiple goals is here determined by balancing 
standing precision (reporting long-term value to the agent) and perceived 
opportunity. The latter is cashed [Friston, Schwartenbeck, et al. 2014] by 
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currently attainable, sufficiently valued sub-goals being accorded extra-high 
precision, thus preferentially entraining action. Dopamine – a key player in the 
game of precision-weighting – here plays a major role reporting what is both 
salient and actionable in the present web of opportunities. In this way stories 
that appeal to distinct cognitive and conative factors, such as the 
neuroeconomic models described by Sanfey et al [2006], are fully subsumed 
under the more encompassing and unified picture of an economy of 
predictions nuanced and enabled by shifting matrixes of precision-weighting. 
 
 6. Beyond Belief, Beyond Desire. 
 
I have argued that, using the resources sketched above, PP is able to capture 
whatever complex webs of changing desire and motivation the standard story 
posits. But this suggests another kind of worry. At this point, we may seem 
simply to have reconstructed the standard story, but to have done so in a way that 
loses transparency without adding any real value. For it requires us to posit 
complex webs of (perhaps mutually inconsistent) predictions, some playing the 




 Klein [2018:2551] presses just such a concern, worrying that a 
sufficiently powerful PP story of this kind closely resembles traditional 
motivation-based accounts but that: 
 
…the bookkeeping with one state gets complicated, while a system with 
more primitives (such as a belief-desire model) can more easily keep 
track of shifting needs, goals, and facts about the world. 
 
Having thus gone to some pains to show that the PP approach has all the 
resources to capture commonsense intuitions about behavior, we must now ask 
what, if anything, is really different enough in the PP-treatment to recommend it.  
 
 What’s most importantly different is that there’s now a different and 
arguably much more unified internal architecture, trading in a single currency 
(predictions, prediction errors, and their precisions). The shape of this 
architecture is reasonably straightforward. On top of simple reflex arcs (and 
autonomic homeostasis) there emerge more ‘Pavlovian’ controllers, whereby 
the sound of a ringing bell (say) comes to predict and hence bring about the 
sequences of interoceptive signals that normally accompany the sight and 
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ingestion of food3. On top of those emerge further ‘instrumental controllers’, 
so that if (for example) we learn that the bell rings whenever our hand moves a 
certain way, we may start to ‘expect’ to generate food or rewards by moving 
our hand in that fashion. Further up the ladder, as we saw, human agents, 
immersed in their idiosyncratic social and cultural environments, start to form 
and exploit ‘counterfactual predictions’ tracking what we would experience and 
infer about the world if we acted in some specific way.  
 
 What emerges is indeed a rich and unified architecture marked by the 
successive contextualization of control by higher and higher level predictions, 
implicating different neural areas and neuronal populations, but all co-operating 
within a single processing regime defined using a common currency of 
predictions, precision estimations, and prediction errors. At the bottom of the 
stack are simple peripheral reflexes (e.g. involving proprioceptive predictions 
that determine set points for stretch receptors that then automatically translate 
into movements). Towards the top lie more intuitively agency-reflecting 
(indeed, agency-constituting) predictions, such as the prediction that I will go 
and see such-and- such a movie tonight.  
  
																																																								
3 Here, and in the rest of this paragraph, I briefly rehearse the much richer and more detailed 
picture presented in [Pezzulo et al 2015;2018] 
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 Importantly, the overarching schema is just the same as the schema for 
basic perceptual inference. Here too (just as in ordinary perception) low-level 
predictions are contextualized by higher-and higher level predictions, nuanced 
by shifting precision estimations. Reflexive, habitual, locally goal-directed, and 
fully ‘prospective’ (future-oriented, in the sense of Seligman [2013]) behaviors 
are revealed as simply different contextualizations within a single continuum of 
prediction-based control.  
 
 In deploying this complex hierarchy, all the usual costs and benefits 
apply. Time-pressured or resource-pressured response will recruit more 
habitual forms of control, requiring less processing and delivering faster results 
(see e.g. [Clark 2016; chapter 8]. By self-organizing around changing prediction 
error signals, these systems generate a flux of precision estimations that allow 
behaviors to be controlled by just about any possible combination of 
experientially ‘deliberative’ and more ‘automatic’ processes. This delivers a vast 
spectrum of task- and context-sensitive response that potentially affords far 
richer possibilities than more traditional (‘dual route’) models of the kind 
effectively critiqued by Hommel and Weirs [2017]. 
 
 So does the PP story really do away with motivation and desire? We 
need not (and should not) gloss the complex, multi-level PP story as 
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eliminativist in any strong sense. The patterns it depicts in human behavior are 
real, and the discourse ‘earns its keep’ (for an extended argument to this effect, 
see Dewhurst [2017]). But desires, intentions, and motivations are now all 
realized as varying forms and time-scales of prediction. Desires thus realized 
are standing (generative model-based) predictions that become active and 
positioned to entrain actions according to the context-varying flux of precision-
weighting.  Such a picture is revisionary with regard to the traditional picture of 
minds as mechanisms that work by combining instantiations of the distinct 
cognitive kinds of belief and desire. But the PP story is thus every bit as 
revisionary about beliefs (considered as parts of the machinery of mind and 
action) as it is about desires. For all that is posited are multi-level, multi-
timescale webs of probabilistic priors that sculpt predictions, that can act in 
ways that are both belief-like and desire-like.  
 
 Summing up, active predictions that are accorded high precision, if they 
also imply precise (highly-weighted) proprioceptive consequences, get to 
entrain local action. These active states are self-fulfilling prophecies, capable of 
helping to bring about the very states of affairs they describe. Such states must 
arise and dissolve, self-organizing around prediction error, in ways that realize 
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our experiences of belief, desire, and all the other states (hope, fear, love, anger) 
that together make up the phenomenological flux4.    
 
7. Conclusions: Predictions as Controllers 
 
Critics have questioned whether predictive processing (PP) has the resources to 
accommodate the full complexities of motivated human behavior. I have tried 
to show that such skepticism is unwarranted. Most fundamentally, this is 
because it is a mistake is to treat prediction as some kind of passive projection 
of statistics from past experience (individual or species) into the future. Instead, 
a major role of prediction (in PP) is to bring about the statistical patterns in 
behavior that define us both as individuals and as a species. Relatedly, the 
estimated precision of specific predictions is not, as is sometimes thought,  
simply a measure of systemic confidence in their accuracy or reliability – rather, 
it is a device that actively positions some predictions for the control of 
behavior. Although PP posits only a few types of computational states 
(predictions, precisions, and prediction errors), those core states can thus be 
functionally poised in many ways, and associated with a wide variety of 
cognitive contents.  
																																																								
4	I have not attempted to outline the PP account of other human attitudes here, 
but for some hints, see Joffily and Coricelli [2013] 
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 Neurally realized predictions here play a dual role, both responding to 
past experience and sculpting future choice and action. Such states are 
somewhat belief-like, consisting in precision-weighted predictions, but 
somewhat desire-like too, since they may select and entrain actions at multiple 
time-scales. It is perhaps surprising to see the same computational construct 
performing both these functions. But this allows the brain to construct 
motivation, motor control, and action selection using exactly the same 
computational palette.  The result is a fluid and highly context-sensitive regime 
that integrates control and motivation at every level. This may slowly reveal a 
new and richer landscape within which to think about agency, control, and 
choice. 
 
* Heartfelt thanks to the three anonymous referees whose careful and 
constructive comments have hugely improved this treatment. Thanks also to 
Anil Seth, Jakob Hohwy, Colin Klein, and Karl Friston for useful discussion of 
many of these ideas. The paper was written thanks to support from ERC 
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